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T
he terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon on
September 11, 2001, brought the issue
of U.S. border security to the forefront.
In the weeks following the attacks,
heightened U.S. security measures
caused serious delays on the northern
and, especially, the southern borders.
Increased security will in turn increase
the cost of business in the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
countries.  Resources must be deployed
in a way that minimizes the economic
costs of doing business across the
borders of an increasingly integrated
North American economy. At the same
time, this must be accomplished without
compromising U.S. security needs.
Therein lies the dilemma.
Border Talks before September 11
While in Washington in early Septem-
ber 2001, Mexican President Vicente Fox
raised the issue of legalizing the status
of illegal migrants in the United States
through some form of guest worker
permits.  On October 5, during his first
U.S. visit after the September 11 at-
tacks, President Fox reiterated his vision
of a trilateral cooperation: “We have to
share information about intelligence,
share control of migratory movements,
customs issues, information about
airports and aircraft in our territories.”
Such cooperation has long been a
given in the U.S.-Canada relationship.
Prior to the attacks, the notion of a
common security perimeter was widely
discussed in Washington and Ottawa.
Amid security concerns and growing
cross-border traffic, U.S. Ambassador
to Canada Paul Cellucci suggested that
Canada, the United States, and Mexico
jointly manage external border entry
points while dismantling internal borders.
The Canada-United States Partnership
(CUSP), an advisory group created by
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and
President Bill Clinton in 1999, recom-
mends policy harmonization on visa
requirements, immigration, and security
operations between Canada and the
United States, and many Canadians
support the idea as a means to reduce
border frictions and the potential for
gridlock. Indeed, a recent survey found
that 85 percent of Canadians generally
favor making the changes necessary to
create a North American security perim-
eter.  Although some Canadian officials
object to the notion of policy coordination,
voicing concerns over the independence
of Canadian policy and the implications
for Canadian sovereignty, the Canadian
government has already begun the
process of harmonizing some of its laws
with the United States, introducing draft
legislation on terrorism, border opera-
tions, and immigration procedures.Texas Business Review 2 February 2002
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Moreover, efforts by
the United States to
legalize this flow of
Mexican migrants will
likely be delayed by
the heightened concerns
over border security.
Essentially, a common perimeter
between Canada and the United States
would mean that people or goods
entering either country from other
countries would gain entry to both
simultaneously.  But what about the
third NAFTA partner? Where does
Mexico fit in this equation?
Border Realities after September 11
Unlike U.S.-Canada interactions, the
U.S.-Mexico relationship is more fraught
with mistrust, and nowhere is this more
in evidence than along the border
between the two countries. Security at
the U.S.-Mexico border contrasts
sharply with that at the U.S.-Canada
border. At the time of the terrorist
attacks, the United States employed
334 border patrol agents and 498
inspectors on the Canadian border and
8,893 agents and inspectors on the
Mexican border, with more than 1,400
in Arizona alone. The northern border
ratio is one border guard for every
4,000 legal crossings; on the southern
side, one border guard for every 1,100
legal crossings. Clearly, most of the
guards on the U.S.-Mexico border are
deployed to catch illegal crossings.
September 11 only exacerbated these
differences. Following the terrorist
attacks, the U.S. customs service
stationed one hundred extra officers on
the Canadian border in order to staff all
crossing points 24 hours a day. Initially,
wait times to enter the United States
increased dramatically—as much as
twelve hours in some instances. Those
times were reduced to near normal
within one week (in part due to a sharp
drop in freight volumes). The story was
very different, however, on the south-
ern boundary of the United States, the
busiest border in the world. Trucks
formed long lines on the Mexican side,
and, in some cases, they were delayed
by days, upsetting production sched-
ules of U.S. manufacturing companies
that depended on intermediate goods
for just-in-time production processes.
Obviously, Mexico is one of the
countries most adversely affected by the
terrorist attacks on the United States.
Extra security on the border has slowed
the passage of goods and people. The
economic impact on the United States
echoes across the border in Mexico.
Almost 90 percent of Mexican exports
are destined for the United States and
roughly one-third of the Mexican
economy depends on trade. Manufac-
turing in Mexico grew at the rate of 10
percent annually between 1996 and 2000.
Much of this growth resulted from the
export of durable goods.  In September
2001, U.S. consumption of durable
goods decreased by 8 percent, the single
biggest monthly drop ever recorded.
Movement, both legal and illegal,
across the border has also been severely
affected. In the first month after the
attacks, big tourist resorts in Cancun
and Acapulco reported a 50 percent
decrease in tourism. Likewise, the
hundreds of thousands of poor Mexi-
cans who cross the border illegally each
year now find their passage north even
more difficult, as indicated by indirect
evidence:  the number of people de-
ported by the U.S. Immigration authori-
ties fell by 40 percent during the first
month after the attack.  Moreover,
efforts by the United States to legalize this
flow of Mexican migrants will likely be
delayed by the heightened concerns over
border security.
This economic damage, coupled with
the criticism leveled at Mexico for its
lukewarm response to U.S. calls for
international anti-terrorism efforts
(initial polls showed 62 percent of
Mexicans favoring neutrality), have
provoked some soul searching among
Mexicans that may ultimately do much
to improve the relationship between
these neighbors. Mexican authorities
cooperated fully with their American
counterparts to monitor the flow of
people from the United States to
Mexico in the days following the at-
tacks. The Mexican airlines worked
with the Federal Aviation Administra-Texas Business Review 3 February 2002
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tion to meet U.S. security standards.  In
fact, the two largest Mexican carriers,
Mexicana and AeroMexico, already
have code-sharing agreements with
United Airlines and Delta Airlines.
Regardless of past difficulties, it is even
more imperative now that Mexico and
the United States work more closely on
security issues. And paramount among
these issues is the cross-border move-
ment of people.
Moving People: Trilateral Cooperation?
The exact implications of September
11 for the movement of people across
borders remain unclear. Roughly 5
million Canadians and 6 million Ameri-
cans cross the northern border each
month. An estimated 25 million people
cross the southern border each month.
Although Mexicans may prove more
resistant than Canadians to the notion of
giving up some national sovereignty to
ensure the security of the region, the
Fox administration has improved
cooperation on many fronts, including a
degree of harmonization of immigration
policies in order to reduce the attrac-
tiveness of Mexico as a gateway for
people smugglers whose destination is
the United States. Nevertheless, many
U.S. lawmakers continue to resist the
Mexican government’s push for some
form of legalization for the estimated 3
million undocumented Mexicans work-
ing in the United States.
Illegal immigration from Mexico
represents both a blessing and a curse
for the United States.  The U.S.
economy benefits from a much-needed
supply of labor.  On the other hand, the
illegal flow of people promotes more
illegal activities, such as people smug-
gling and the abuse of undocumented
workers’ rights.
In the long run, demographic and
economic trends could force a resolu-
tion to the problem.  Projections for the
next thirty years point to increasing
shortages of labor in the United States
and a rapidly aging population in
Mexico that will reduce the number of
young men making the journey north to
the United States. Economic trends in
Mexico will likely raise incomes suffi-
ciently over the same period of time so
that the same degree of openness the
United States affords Canadians can
also be achieved for Mexicans.
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In the meantime, however, border
issues related to the mobility of people
will probably not be addressed on a
trilateral basis among the members of
NAFTA.  Such issues have not been
addressed trilaterally in the past, prima-
rily due to the dramatic differences in
standards of living.  The United States
requires visas for Mexicans but not for
Canadians and imposes a limit of 5,500
NAFTA visas for Mexican white-collar
workers but no limit for Canadians.
U.S. customs officers are stationed at
airports in Canada, but not at airports in
Mexico because of Mexican constraints
on U.S. law enforcement operations
within that country. The United States
continued to resist the entry of Mexican
trucks long after they allowed Canadian
trucks to operate in the country.  Many
border issues are handled on a bilateral
basis, and that format may continue.
The impact of September 11 may be
to perpetuate the existing asymmetries
in the bilateral border relationships in
North America with respect to the
movement of people.  National security
takes precedence over trade under the
trade agreements that apply and is
perhaps the broadest exception con-
tained in those agreements. Despite
recent advances in the relationship
between Mexico and the United States,
the Canadian border remains more open
to the movement of people and can be
policed with fewer personnel.  How-
ever, the tighter security on the Mexican
border remains insufficient to stop the
annual passage of 300,000 illegal
migrants who remain in the United
States, making it a less than optimal
solution over the long term.
Movement of Capital: What Does
NAFTA Say?
On the surface, free capital movement
is already a fact among NAFTA coun-
tries, although, for security purposes,
each of the three governments may
exercise a lot of discretionary power in
the financial sector.  More than 70
percent of banking capital in Mexico is
under foreign control.  In mid-2001, the
largest bank in Mexico, Banamex, was
taken over by Citigroup, which took the
unprecedented step of listing itself on
the Mexican Stock Exchange, the first
foreign company ever to do so. More than
half of the insurance industry in Mexico
is under foreign control as well. Canada
is the largest foreign real estate owner in
the United States, which, in turn, is the
largest source of foreign investment in
Canada. A recent flurry of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions in the financial
sectors of the United States and Canada
has further blurred financial borders.
NAFTA has done much to break
down barriers to cross-border capital
flows. The agreement applies to “per-
sons” of a NAFTA country, that is,
citizens or permanent residents of a
NAFTA member or a business orga-
nized under the law of a NAFTA mem-
ber.  Thus, as long as a company from
outside the region meets the require-
ments for incorporation (or other forms
of business organization) and complies
with foreign investment laws, it may
become a NAFTA company.  However,
companies that are controlled by inves-
tors from outside the region with no
substantial business activities in the
territory of the country under whose
laws it is constituted may be denied
NAFTA benefits.  Benefits may also be
denied if a NAFTA country does not
maintain diplomatic relations with the
investor’s home country or prohibits
business transactions with enterprises
from that country.
NAFTA provides standards for the
treatment of foreign investors. Stan-
dards of nondiscrimination require that
equal treatment be accorded foreign and
domestic investors and that all foreign
investors be treated equally. In addition,
foreign investors are entitled to a
minimum standard of treatment:  each
country must treat investors in accor-
dance with customary international law,
including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security.
The tighter security on
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remains insufficient to
stop the annual passage
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The agreement also prohibits restric-
tions on transfers of profits, proceeds,
or payments, unless the restrictions are
due to the application of laws relating
to bankruptcy, securities, criminal
offenses, currency transfer reporting,
or enforcement of judgments.  Govern-
ments therefore remain free to restrict
transfers under laws such as those
relating to money laundering and those
that permit the freezing of assets in
litigation and bankruptcy proceedings.
Following September 11, the NAFTA
governments used money laundering
laws to deal with terrorist funds.
NAFTA also contains a more general
national security exception that applies
to all of its provisions, including the
treatment of foreign investors. Because
it is so broad and discretionary, this
exception could be used to restrict
capital movements whenever one of the
governments considers such restric-
tions necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests in a time of
war or other emergency in international
relations.  While there have been no
cases interpreting this provision under
NAFTA or the equivalent provision
under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), capital restrictions
placed on terrorist funds in the context
of the September 11 attacks would
very likely qualify under this exception.
Support for this view may be found in
the preparatory work relating to the
equivalent GATT security exception.
One of the drafters of the original
charter stated: “We cannot make it [the
security exception] too tight, because
we cannot prohibit measures which are
needed purely for security reasons.  On
the other hand, we cannot make it so
broad that, under the guise of security,
countries will put on measures which
really have a commercial purpose.”  In
the case of restrictions on terrorist funds,
the purpose of the measures would
clearly be related to their security
interests, not a commercial purpose.
Movement of Goods
Heightened security efforts will
increase the cost of moving goods
across the border.  This will impose a
higher cost of producing goods with
production systems spread across the
borders.  This might slow the process of
integration across the three countries.
With technology and the large-scale
movement of goods, NAFTA countries
should be able to exploit economies of
scale.  Thus, the additional long-run
marginal cost may be negligible.  An
instructive example can be drawn from
the seizure of illegal drugs, a barometer
of the drug trade (between Mexico and
the United States).  For the first two
weeks after September 11, the drug
seizures across the border were down by
half.  By early October, the drug seizures
were back to pre-attack level, indicating
that traffickers quickly found alternative
ways of keeping up their supply.  The
same could apply for the movement of
legal goods within a few months.
The Importance of Including Mexico
The movement of illegal goods and
illegal migrants also points to the impor-
tance of Mexico.  Ignoring Mexico
leaves a large hole in the U.S. security
perimeter.  If it is so easy for goods and
people to move across the border, how
does the United States plan to improve
security without Mexican cooperation?
As long as the United States cannot set
up an impenetrable fence across its
southern border, it needs Mexico to be a
part of the security strategy.  The uneasy
history between the two neighbors,
however, complicates the task confront-
ing policymakers on both sides of the
border as they consider new security
realities after September 11.◆Texas Business Review 6 February 2002
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Women’s Business
Leadership Conference
Charting New Landscapes
The Bureau of Business Research
and The McCombs School will
host this one-day event for
matriculated and prospective MBA
students on Friday, February 15,
2002. The conference will feature
Bernee Strom, CEO of The Strom
Group, as keynote speaker and
will include panels of business
leaders, entrepreneurs, and
managers discussing topics such
as managing in the corporate
environment, balancing work and
home life, and working in a small
high-tech firm. Registration is free
but space is limited. Visit the
conference website (http://
texasmba.bus.utexas.edu/
MBAWomen/conference/) or call
(512) 475-7813 for
information.◆
Year  Total U.S.  trade 
(current $ millions) 
U.S. trade with 
NAFTA partners 
(current $ millions) 
U.S. trade with all 
other countries 
(current $ millions) 
Ratio: U.S.-NAFTA 
to all U.S. trade 
(percentage) 
1996 1,420,364  421,192  999,172  29.7 
1997 1,557,472  475,382  1,082,090  30.5 
1998 1,594,000  502,715  1,091,285  31.5 
1999 1,717,587  558,987  1,158,600  32.5 
2000 1,997,306  653,270  1,344,036  32.7 
 
Value of U.S. Merchandise Trade with Canada and Mexico
Compared with U.S. Trade with All Other Countries,
1996-2000